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STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE
This is an action before the Supreme Court of Utah pursuant to
Utah Code Annotated 1953, Section 35-4-10(i), as amended, for the purpose
of judicial review of and determination of the lawfulness of a decision of
the Board of Review of the Industrial Commission of Utah, affirming the
decision of the Appeals Referee denying benefits to Plaintiff on the grounds
that during the base period July 1, 1976, through June 30, 1977, the Plaintiff was not an employee of Medexam but was self-employed, and that during
said base period Plaintiff had insufficient weeks of employment for eligibility.

The questions are whether the Plaintiff was in "employment" as

defined in the Utah Employment Security Act and case law, and whether the
decision of the Board of Review is supported by substantial evidence in the
record.
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DISPOSITION BY BOARD OF REVIEW,
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
Plaintiff was disqualified from receiving unemployment compensation
benefits in a review decision of a Department Representative dated Sept~
ber 22, 1977.

The qecision was affirmed pya Department Appeals Referee in

a decision dated December 8, 1977, and the decision of the Appeals Referee
was affirmed by the Board of Review in a decision dated January 24, 1978,
in Case No. 77-A-3553, 77-BR-301.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON REVIEW
Defendant Board of Review of the Industrial Connnnission of Utah
seeks affirmation of the decision denying benefits to Plaintiff on the
grounds that said decision is supported by substantial evidence and that
Plaintiff was not in the "employ" of Medexam as defined in the Act and
case law, and thus had insufficient weeks of employment during his base
period to qualify.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Medexam is a Utah based corporation which is engaged in the
business of administering physical examinations.

Their principal clienb

are insurance companies for the purpose of underwriting risks. They also
perform physical examinations for other firms such as employment physicals,
ICC physicals, etc.

(R.0022 and 0063)

Medexam enters into an agreement with various insurance companies
and others to conduct physical examinations for them and a fee is agreed to
according to the type of examination performed.
2

(R.0038)

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

For the purpose of establishing clinics OP franchises to

per~

the examinations, Medexam enters into an agreement with individuals sametimes referred to as "partnership" agreements and someSimes referru to as.
"licensing" agreements.

(R.0039-0040) Such individuals have

sional backgrounds, i.e., training and experience to enable
work.

para-p~fes-

th~

_

to do the

In the instant case no written agreement was signed. The verbal

agreement provided that at the outset Plaintiff should receive seventy
percent of the gross receipts, which was later changed to ninety percent
(R.0041) and that Medexam should receive the balance. Medexam was tope
paid directly by the insurance companies or other firms and Medexam was
to disburse Plaintiff's share to him at an agreed time once a month.
(R.0042)
Prior to entering into the verbal franchise arrangement with
Medexam, Plaintiff had been employed as a physical examiner by Body Metrics
for whom he worked for wages.

(R.0036)

Plaintiff had received training

from the Louisiana College of Nursing and had served as a medic in the
military and was qualified as an emergency medical technician.

(R.0037)

In September 1976 Plaintiff pursuant to said verbal franchise agreement
established a clinic or outlet to operate in Ogden, Utah, to take over an
operation that had previously been established in said city, initially
working out of his own home.

(R.0037) The Plaintiff acquired his cli-

ents by contacting and soliciting various agents of insurance companies
directly and some were referred to him by Medexam.

(R.0037) Plaintiff

contacted, interviewed, hired, trained, and paid examiners which he
referred to as "sa tel 1ites" to conduct physical examinations in Brigham
City and Logan, Utah, and in Preston and Pocatello, Idaho. (R.0041 • 0042,
3
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·.·

"

0049)

In May of 1977 Plaintiff rented office space in Ogden, Utah, under

the franchise trade name "Medexam" and paid all of his business expenses
through his own checking account and handled his books and records regarding the business.

(R.0042, 0047)

The Pla1ntiff and Medexam

term~pated

their business relationship

by mutual agreement on the 23rd of July 1977 after two days of discussions.
(R.0045)

Plaintiff voluntarily gave up his rights as a franchisee. He

refused to attend meetings called by Medexam to define and clarify the
relationship between the parties.

(R.0043)

It is understandable that he

refused to sign the "partnership" agreement proffered by Medexam because
it did not fit the situation.

However, Plaintiff refused to participate

in the process necessary to clarify the relationship between the parties
to enable a written formalization thereof. The situation reached an
impasse and the parties mutually terminated it.

(R.0043-0044)

4
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PLAINTIFF CRAIG A. BLAMIRES
AND MEDEXAM OF UTAH WAS A FRANCHISE ARRANGEMENT RATHER
THAN AN EMPLOYER-EMPLOYEE RELATIONSHIP OR PARTNERSHIP.
Plaintiff claims his status in this case was that of an employee.
The record refers to a "partnership agreement" (R.0027-0034) which Plaintiff refused to sign. Said writing entitled "partnership agreement" did
not set forth the true relationship between Plaintiff Blamires and Medexam,
and it is thus not surprising that Plaintiff Blamires refused to sign it.
(R.0045-0046)

Mr. Reginald Ron Smith, President of Medexam Associates,

Inc., a Utah corporation (R.0036 and 0043), hereinafter referred to as
"Medexam," stated that originally said agreement was referred to as a
"licensing agreement," then called "partnership," and then switched back

•

to "1 i cens i ng agreement," with no difference as to the contents, only a
matter· of semantics.

(R.0039-0040)

During the ten years immediately preceding the first publication of this work, franchising had mushroomed as a means
of expanding an ever-widening variety of businesses, thereby
enabling a large number of companies to achieve nationwide
distribution of their products and services within a short
space of time and with a comparatively small outlay of their
own capital. Simultaneously, innumerable individuals with
little capital found through franchising a way to achieve
the status of an independent businessman under the guidance
of an experienced cympany and backed by the reputation of a
well-known product .
. . . a franchise is a license from the owner of a trademark
or trade ·name permitting another to sell a product or service under that name or mark. The trademark and the trade
name have been called "the cornerstone of a franchise system."
The license granted cannot be a naked one. :he owner of.the
mark or name has a duty to the public to pollee the qual1t~
of the product or service marketed under the mark or name.
115 Business Organizations, Glickman, Franchising, page 1-1.
2rd

page

2-1.

5
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•.• The franchise has evolved as an elaborate agreement
under which the franchisee undertakes to conduct business
or sell a product or service in accordance with methods and
procedures prescribed by the franchisor and the franchisor
undert~kes to assist the.franchisee through advertising,
promot1on, and othe~ adv~sory services. The franchise may
encompass an exclus1ve r1ght to sell the product in a specified territory.3
Also, another definition of franchise:
. . . an arrangement whereby a firm (franchisor) which has
developed a pattern or formula for the conduct of a particular kind of business extends to other firms (franchisees)
the right to engage in the business provided they follow
the established pattern.4
The Federal Trade Commission has observed:
The essence of any franchise system is the establishment
of quasi-independent businessmen subject to various controls respecting their business operations, the nature of
which depends in part on the philosophy of the franchisor
and on the nature of the products and services franchised.
However, some form of control over the franchisee is an
essential ingredient of the franchise system.5
Most franchises involve the sale of a product or service
to the consumer. Thus, most franchises are classified as
retail businesses. Basically, they fall into three categories:
(2) Chain-style businesses, under which the franchisee
operates his business under the franchisor's trade
name, is identified as a member of a select group of
dealers, and generally is required to follow standardized or prescribed methods of operation. Under
this arrangement, the franchisor may control the
franchisee as to such matters as the location and
3rd page 2-2.
page 2-2.1, referring to statement of Eugene P. Foley, hearings pursuant
to S. Res. 40 on S. 1842, S. 1843 and S. 1844, before Senate Subconm. on
Antitrust and Monopoly, 89th Cong., 1st Se~s. (1965) . . The speak~r wasof,
addressing himself primarily to the franch1sor who 1s 1n the b~slnessl t!
selling franchises as distinguished from the manufacturer seek1ng out e
for a specific product. See Section 2.02 infra.
.
page 2-2.1, referring to report of Ad Hoc Comm1ttee
on Franc h1· s1· ng sub·na
mitted to the Federal Trade Commission by its staff on June 2, 19 69t'0 a
announced by the FTC on December 10, 1969, quoting FTC Memorandum
SBA p. 4 (March 10, 1966).
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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appearance of his place of business, the products
sold or used, his bookkeeping methods, advertising
and sales methods, appearance and qualification of
pe~sonngl, hours of business, territory served,
.
pr1ces.
The record in this case clearly manifests a franchise type of
operation rather than partnership or employer-employee. Medexam had developed a pattern of performing services for insurance

compan~e.s,:

f.e., doing

physical examinations on individuals in connection with applications for
insurar.ce policies.

Plaintiff as the franchisee undertook to sell the

service in accordance with the procedures prescribed by the franchisor
(Medexam).

Medexam assisted Plaintiff Blamires through promotion and advi-

sory services.

(R.0038}

Plaintiff was granted exclusive right to sell the

services in a specified territory, Northern Utah and Idaho. Some control
over the Plaintiff was maintained by the franchisor in accordance with the
usua 1 duty to the pub 1i c of a franchisor as owner of the trade name "Medexam"
to police the quality of the service marketed under said trade name.
The relationship clearly was not that of a joint venture or· partnership.

There was no joint control or right of control.

Plaintiff

controlled the operation of his office in Ogden and the satellite offices
he set up.

As between Medexam and Plaintiff there was no joint proprietary

interest in the operation or right to share in the profits or duty to share
in any losses.

Plaintiff ran his own operation. He paid Medexam thirty

percent at first, then later on ten percent, as a franchise fee for use of
the trade name "Medexam" and for the right to participate in performing
physical examinations under the contracts which Medexam had set up with the
various insurance companies.

Plaintiff paid his own expenses--rent, travel,

6Id pages 2.2-12, 2.3.
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secretary, satellite operation, equipment (in fact he leased an EKG machine
from Medexam) without any participation from Medexam.7
POINT II
THE FRANCHISE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PLAINTIFF AND MEDEXAM
IS S~MILAR TO A VENDOR-VENDEE OR LESSOR-LESSEE RELATIONSHIP
l~ THE SENSE THAT IT IS NOT A SERVICE RELATIONS~IP UNDER
SECTION 35-4-22(j)(l) OF THE UTAH EMPLOYMENT SECURITY ACT,
AND THE DECISION OF THE COMMISSION BEING SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE SHOULD BE AFFIRMED.
The applicable provisions of the Utah Employment Security Act are
as follows:
22(j)(l) "Employment" means any service ••• performed for
wages or under agy contract of hire written or oral, express
or implied •••
22(j)(5) Services performed by an individual for wages or
under any contract of hire, written or oral, express or implied, shall be deemed to be employment subject to this act
unless and until it is shown to the satisfaction of the
commission that:
(A) Such individual has been and will continue to
be free from control or direction over the performance
of such services, both under his contract of hire and
in fact;
(B) Such service is either outside the usual course
of the business for which such service is performed
or that such service is performed outside of all the
places of business of the enterprise for which such
service is performed; and
(C) Such individual is customarily engaged in an
independently established trade, occupation, ~rofes
sion, or business of the same nature as that 1nvolved
in the contract of service.9
The Utah Supreme Court has in the past held that vendor-vendee and
lessor-lessee relationships do not come within Section 22(j)(l) because

theY

7see Joint Venture distinguished from Franchise, Id pages 2-31, 2-32, 2-33 ·
Butah Code Annotated 1953, 35-4-22(j)(1).
9utah Code Annotated 1953, 35-4-22(j)(5).
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are not service relationships. Another category should llle -.111M tp . . ,_...
service class, and that is the bona fide franchise

relat10RShi~

True vendor-vendee or a lessee-lessor relationshi.p are aet
service relationships. They fall in the non-service cate~
gory.lO
The fir~t test comes under 19(j)(l): Was the applicattt
perform1ng services for wages or under a contract of -ire?
Under this test it must be detennined whether he falls
under those contractual relationships which are in the
non-service class, such as vendor-vendee or lessor-lessee
relationship. If the applicant survives this test he
must meet the next inclusion-exclusion test under this
hierarchy, to wit: that of 19(j)(5), where if the c~
mission is satisfied that the conditions of the (a), (b),
and (c) clauses concur, the applicant is eliminated from
participation ••. 11
The California Department of Employment Tax Manual treats leases
and franchise arrangements the same as respects the tests to detennine whether
a bona fide lease or franchise arrangement exists.
Bona fide lessees operating independently established
businesses are independent contractors. A bona fide
lessee conducts business under his own name; hires and
pays any necessary assistants; takes out any required
business licenses in his own name; keeps his own books;
collects and advances credit when and to whom he pleases;
collects his own accounts; pays his own business expenses,
and in short, operates free from any direction and control
by the owner of the premises. So, where the agreement
regulates his hours of work; requires that money accruing
from services performed by the lessee be paid to the
lessor; gives the lessor control or authority over
assistants hired by the alleged lessee; and allows the
lessor to terminate the relationship either at will or
within a reasonably short period an employment relatio~
ship will generally exist. Other pertinent factors wh1ch
will tend to establish an employment relationship are the
direct payment of wages by the lessor to either the lessee or his assistants, keeping the alleged lessee's b?oks
of account by the lessor, handling by the lessor of blllings to customers for work done by the alleged lessee,
right of the lessor to restrict granting of credit by
the lessee and similar factors. t 7005.30 (May 30, 1946),
1°FuZZer Brush Company v. Industrial Commission, 99 Ut. 97, 104 P. 2d
201 (1940}.

11 Logan Cache Knitting Mitts v. Industrial Commission, 99 Ut. 1, 102 P. 2d
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
495 (1940).
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quoted i~ C.C.H. Unemp. Ins. Rep. (Cal.) t 1332.) Although
couched 1n terms of lease arrangements, the same reasoning
has been applied to franchise arrangements.lZ
Section 22(j)(l) of the Employment Security Act quoted above and
Section 22(p), to wit:
22(p) "Wages" means all remuneration for personal services
including commissions and bonuses and the cash value of all
remuneration in any medium other than cash. Gratuities customarily received by an individual in the course of his
employment from persons other than his employing unit shall
be treated as wages received from his employing unit. The
reasonable cash value of remuneration in any medium other
than cash and the reasonable amount of gratuities shall be
estimated and determined in accordance with rules prescribed
by the commission; . • .
"define generally the contractual relationships which are believed to be the ,
bases from which springs the kind of unemployment that • . . is by Section 1 ~
!

(of the Utah Employment Security Act) declared to be an economic menace to
the public." 13
These two sections cSections 22(j)(l) and 22(p)J define
contractual relationships which we term service relationships. Examples of these are: employer and employee,
master and servant, principal and agent, and principal and
independent contractor. They are distinguished from nonservice relationships such as vendor and vendee, or lessor
and lessee, in that the factor that induced their execution
is the desire of one contracting party for the service of
the other, and the desire of the latter to render that service. The non-service relationships mentioned, however,
arise from a desire to dispose of and a desire to acquire
either permanently or temporarily property interests. For
example: I learn that my neighbor wants to sell his automobile; he learns that I want to buy a second-hand car.
We get together, it matters not how. I agree to buy and
he agrees to sell. The factor that induced this contract
was our desires as to a property transfer. Suppose that
I, for reasons best known to myself--Scotch if you wish-desire to pay for the car in labor, the labor to be performed under his control and direction. He is agreeable.
1215 Business Organizations, Glickman, Franchising, p. 2-9, 2-10, referring
to California Dept. of Employment Tax Manual.
l3combined Metals Reduction Company v. Industrial Commission, 101 Ut.

116 P. 2d 929 (1941).
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230

•

hired, trained, and paid his own staff of four satellite operatflftS fn fOur
other cities in Utah and Idaho, and paid his own overhead
travel.

ex~

Plaintiff was very irritated when the frlftchfsor fn

t~

tnclldtng

person of

Mr. Smith attempted to interfere with or exercise any control over the operation of what he considered to be his in4ependent business, Plaintiff considered himself to be an independent businessman for tax purposes. Plaintiff
admits that the nature of the relationship between himself and Medexam was
"fuzzy" and uncertain and states that the relationship "evolved into where
I

believed I was a contractor." (R.0042)
The evidence in this case is well within the rule regarding appel-

late review set forth in the Salt Lake Tribune Publishing Company case16 and
the Logan Cache Knitting Mills case17 that the decision of the Commission
will not be upset if there is substantial evidence to support the finding of
the Board of Review •
. . . The evidence set out
finding of the Commission.
is such that we cannot say
reasonable menA have found
such contro1.1c

above is ample to support the
• • • At all events the evidence
that the Commission must, as
that the claimant was free from

In the following cases it was held that questions on relationship of employer-employee, number of employees, etc.,
are "jurisdictional facts" on which the appellate court
will "review and heig~ the evidence certified in the record"
to determine whet er ommission had jurisdiction. (Cases
cited.) In these cases the court considered the evidence
anew and determined what conclusion should have been reached
on those facts and, on the basis of its conclusion, affirmed
or reversed.
The Utah cases are to this effect:

(Cases cited).

16gg Ut. 259, 102 P. 2d 307 (1940).
17gg Ut. 1, 102 P. 2d 495 (1940).
l8sazt Lake Tribune Publishing Company v. Induetri4l COimlieeion, Id.

12
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Has the contract becom~ any the less a contract of sale? No.
The fact that the cons1deration has become in whole or in
part labor instead of cash does not change the contract.
Furthermore, an unexpected termination of that sales contract
does not produce a case of unemployment which is an economic
menace to the public.
Contrast the above illustration with the following: I am a
carpenter. My neighbor wants a chicken coop built. I want
to build it. We get together. He is short of cash but is
willing to give me his automobile in payment. I don't want
an automobile, b~t as I can sell it and get my pay that way,
I accept. What 1nduced the contract? A desire for and a
desire to render services. The fact that the consideration
was payable in whole or in part by property instead of cash
did not change the nature of the contract. I take the automobile as "remuneration payable in any medium other than
cash" (quoting from Section 19(p) above).
In each illustration the important question is: what induced
the parties to enter into the contractual relationship? If
the service factor, it falls within Sections 19(j)(l) and
19(p); if the non-service factor, then those sections exclude
the contractual relationship from the benefits of the Unemployment Compensation Law.l4
Applying the above tests to the instant case we have a typical
franchise situation where the franchisee, the Plaintiff, is seeking to

acqui~
;

a property interest, i.e., a business of his own, utilizing the trade name [
of "Medexam," under the guidance of an experienced company and backed by the
I

rep uta ti on of services we 11 known and estab 1i shed in the insurance i ndustry.E'
I

The record supports the finding of the Referee and the Board of
Review that Plaintiff's objective was to acquire a business rather than to
render a service for Medexam.

As mentioned in Point IV, Plaintiff set up

his own office, paid the rent, hired a secretary, terminated one secretary
and hired another, arranged for his own phone, obtained his own equipment,
contacted insurance agents directly to promote his own business, recruited,
14Id, dissent of Justice Pratt on the facts, but the above statement of
the law is not disputed.
15see Footnote 1, Supra.
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Most courts, however, have held that commission findints of
employer-employee relationship, number of employees etc.
are binding on the reviewing court unless there is ~nab-'
sence of substantial evidence in the record. (Cases cited.)
The statement is common throughout these cases that the
finding of the Commission on points, regarding which there
is conflicting evidence, is conclusive and that the court
is without power to review the evidence. Most of the cases
were appealed beca~se of ~ fin~ing of employer-em~loyee
re~ationship but the cour~s ~eld Commission f,~ndings on this
po1nt conclusive. It should be .no~d that there are holdings both ways in California and Olino.is. ·
. .
I think as a matter of policy the courts should nQt att~pt
to substitute their judgment for that of Commissions who
gain experience by constant dealing with administration of
the Acts which created them. Certainly such bodies should
become expert in making factual conclusions. For that reason I think the line between jurisdictional and non-jurisdictional facts should not be extended further than necessary
to act as a justifiable check on the administrative tribunal
and that the review should be almost altogether on questions
of law. A further reason is that any extension of the scope
of review puts additional burdens upon the courts which are
already overburdened.19
The decision in the instant case being supported by substantial
evid~nce

should be affirmed.

POINT III
THE UTAH SUPREME COURT HAS DEPARTED FROM THE SECTION 22{j)
(5)(C) TEST AS PRONOUNCED IN THE LEACH V. BOARD OF REVI&W
CASE20 AND OTHER PRIOR CASES BY VfRTUE OF ITS DECISION IN
THE NORTH AMERICAN BUILDERS CASE2 AND HAS SET A NEW STANDARD FOR SATISFYING "C" OF THE "ABC" TEST. THE "C" TEST IS
SATISFIED IN THE INSTANT CASE.
The basic point of contention involved (j)(S)~C); were the
installers engaged in an independently establ1shed trade or
business of the same nature as that involved in the contract
of service?22
l9Jct Logan cache Knitting MiZZs v. IndustriaZ Commission,

discussion of

Justice Wolfe in dissent on other grounds.
20 H. L. & Irene Leach d/b/a/ Rusco Wind.ow CoTTTpany v. Board of Review, 123 Ut.
423, 260 P.

2d

744 (1953).

21 North ~erican BuiZders v. UneTTTpZoyment CoTTTpensation Division, 22 Ut. 2d
338, 453 P. 2d 142 (1969)
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The court in North American Builders concluded that the installers
of metal siding were self-employed craftsmen who performed their services
for the supplier of the siding materials while in pursuit of an independentl)
established trade in which they were customarily engaged.
A contrary conclusion was reached in Leach. However, there
are significant differences. The instaTTers in Leach were
trained by the suppliers after,which they ~ntered into a
written contract to perform the service necessary to install
the products in a workmanlike manner; the installers were
regularly employed elsewhere; and, the suppliers were the
sole distributors in Utah of Rusco Windows and products and
thus were the on~ persons who could accept orders and supply the windows.
The "significant differences" from Leach referred to above are
present in the instant case. The Plaintiff was not trained by Medexam. He
was already well trained by virtue of schooling, military service, and employ·
ment with Body Metrics.

(R.0036 and 0037)

In the instant case there is no

contract to perform the physical examinations in any particular manner.
There is no evidence to indicate that Medexam exercised any direction or
control over the manner or means by which the Plaintiff accomplished the
physical examinations.

Medexam's only interest was to police the quality

of the service rendered under its trade name the same as any other franchisor.

In the instant case, Plaintiff was not regularly employed elsewhere.

Also Medexam is not the sole provider of the physical examinations for
insurance companies in the State of Utah.
is at least one other--Body Metrics.

According to the record there

(R.0036)

The Utah Supreme Court in the North American Builders case, supra,
has followed the Indiana case of ALumiwaLL Corporation v. Indiana emplo~@t
23rct.

14
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'

Seaur'ity Board 24 and has quoted the following from said case as ·• IUille.,tf• , ...

applying test "C" of the "ABC" test:
The second standard is whether or not such services were
an independently established trade, occupation profession
or business. Again it would seem that such applicators·
were engaged in an independent business. They owned and
supplied their own tools and equipment, hired and fired
their own helpers, were free to work or not to work as they
saw fit, and could perform the same services for other than
appellant if they so desired.25
Applying the criteria quoted from the Alumiwall case to the instant
case the "C" test is satisfied.

Plaintiff owned or leased or rented his own

office, equipment and facilities, phone, etc., he hired and fired his own
helpers.

Plaintiff set his own appointments to perform physical examinations.

He was not regulated by Medexam as to when he worked or didn't work. He was
free to work or not to work as he saw fit.

No doubt he worked whenever he

had the chance, but such is the case with many independent franchise businesses.
won't

If you go into one of these quick-food franchise operations, you

~5ually

see the franchisee operator sitting around. There is nothing

in the record to indicate that Plaintiff performed the same services for
other than Medexam.

However, there is also nothing in the record to indi-

cate that Plaintiff did not and/or could not perform the same services for
other than Medexam if he had so desired.
All of the criteria from Alumiwall are satisfied with the possible
exception of freedom to perform the same services for other than Medexam.
In light of the other strong signs of independence in the record, such element is not necessary.

Also, in the typical franchise arrangement, such

element will not be present.

For instance, the owner of a "Big Boy" franchise

i 5 not ab 1e to perform the same "service" for some other franchisor, such as
24 Alumiwall Corp. v. Indiana Employment Security Board, 167 N.E. 2d 60 {1960).
25 North
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"Burger King."

It would seem clear that a franchisee in a franchise oper t'

a 1~,

clearly meets the "C" test as being customarily engaged in an independently
established trade or profession, even though limited under his franchise
agreement to use only the trade name of the franchisor.
There are strong indications of the independent status of Plaintiff:
I

arising out of the circumstances of the termination of the business relat; 011• I
ship between the parties.

(R.0045)

Mr. Smith of Medexam and the Plaintiff

terminated their business association by mutual agreement.
case of an employer firing an employee.

I

It was not a

It was not a particularly unusual

termination of a franchise relationship by mutual action of the parties.
The parties discussed the matter in a conversation on July 21, 1977, and in
a phone conversation on July 22, 1977, and the next day each wrote to the
other indicating a mutual determination to terminate the relationship.
(R.0045)

Plaintiff voluntarily gave up his rights as franchisee.

He could

have actively pursued formalization of his business relationship with Medex11.
He could have had his own attorney draw up a contract correctly stating the
franchise relationship between the parties.

It is understandable that he

balked at signing the partnership agreement submitted to him becau~e it just
didn't fit the situation.

But instead of trying to get together w1th Medexil

I
'
1
I

to go through the process (and it is a hard one and one often overlooked)

!

of defining the relationship and clarifying where the parties stood, and
reducing the same to writing, Plaintiff refused to attend meetings called

by

Medexam to discuss the contract and took an obstructive stance regarding
negotiations rather than a positive, willing, helpful attitude towards the
obviously necessary clarification and formalization of the relationship
between the parties.

(R.0043-0044)

'ff
Excerpts from the letters of Plaintl

16
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and Medexam at the time of the termination are illuminating as to the relationship of the parties:
Plaintiff's letter:
. . . I hereby take full responsibility of making payment
to my satellite~ in Pocatello, Idaho, Preston, Idaho, Logan,
Utah, and Bount1ful, Utah; what is rightfully due to them
per agreement between them and I for their.June 20th billing . . . (R.0045 and 0025)
·
Plaintiff acknowledges that they were his satellites pursuant to an agreement
between Plaintiff and the satellites.
Mr. Smith's letter:
In light of our conversation of the 21st, and your failure
to attend four of our last five meetings, and your conversation by telephone with me on the 22nd, I feel it necessary
to terminate any and all business associations effective
immediately. (R.0045 and 0025-a)
The statement " . . • necessary to terminate any and all business associations
effective immediately" sounds more like a relationship of franchisor-franchisee
than employer-employee.

If Plaintiff had been an employee, Smith would have

said, "necessary to terminate you."
POINT IV
THE FACTS IN THE INSTANT CASE AS CONTAINED IN THE RECORD
CLEARLY SUPPORT THE DECISION OF THE DEFENDANT BOARD OF
REVIEW OF THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION THAT PLAINTIFF WAS
NOT IN THE "EMPLOYMENT" OF MEDEXAM WITHIN THE MEANING OF
SECTION 22(j) OF THE UTAH EMPLOYMENT SECURITY ACT.
Plaintiff did not receive any training from Medexam.

He was com-

pletely qualified to do the physical examinations without any instruction
or supervision as to the manner and means of accomplishing the same.
Plaintiff could and did actively promote his own business.

(R.0037)
He

contacted insurance agents directly to procure examination business.
26 see Footnote 42, infra.
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26

. . • I would go out and procure--! would say, "Mr. Insurance Agent, I would like to do these examinations that are
required by your company." He would then call me. (R 0037
0048)
•
•
Medexam did public relations in behalf of Plaintiff and set the
price to be charged for the examinations.

(R.0038)

Both of these functions

are common in franchising arrangements.27
The forma 1i ty whereby Medexam makes the fi na 1 arrangement with the
insurance company and bills the insurance company is comparable to the
arrangement in the North American Builders case.

In that case the home-

owner for whom the work was done did not contract with the installer, but
rather with the dealer.

When the job was finished the homeowner paid the

dealer, who then paid the installer in accordance with an agreed-upon formula based upon siding installed, comparable to the formula for compensation
of the Plaintiff at seventy percent or ninety percent of a fixed price for
a physical examination. (R.0039) 28
Plaintiff leased equipment from Medexam, including an EKG machine
(R.0040), which is not consistent with an employer-employee relationship.
It was the responsibility of Plaintiff to obtain his own license
to conduct his business.

(R.0040, 0049)

Plaintiff solicited, interviewed, hired, trained, and paid examiners to work for and under him in Brigham City, Preston, Idaho, Pocatello,
Idaho, and Logan.

He paid these examiners an amount agreed upon by Plain-

tiff and each examiner.
Referee:

(R.0041, 0042, 0049)

You paid all of your own expenses.and how d~d.
you arrive at the fee that was pa1d to the lndlviduals you hired? Did you set that fee?

27see Footnote 3 and Footnote 6.
28see Footnote 21.
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Blamires:

I paid.them what I was suggested to pay them by
Mr. Sm1th.

Referee:

In other words, if they decided not to work for
that much, were you authorized out of your own
90 percent to change the fee fn any way?

Blamires:

I could

Referee:

In other words, that was more or less within
your control what you paid them?

Bl ami res:

Yes.

Referee:

Depending on your agreement with them?

Blamires:

Yes.

(R.0042)

Plaintiff admits that the relationship evolved to the point where
he considered himself to be self-employed and he treated himself as selfemployed for tax purposes after consultation with his "tax man."
Blamires:

(R.0042)

Later on, after we switched to the 90 percent,
after talking to my tax man and in the course
of many discussions, it evolved to the point
where we realized that we were supposed to
really be an independent contractor. (R.0043)

Medexam required that Plaintiff attend some meetings but not for
the purpose of training or asserting control over Plaintiff, but rather because Medexam's attorney was rightly insisting that there needed to be a
clarification of the relationship between the parties, a meeting of the minds,
and a written formalization of such understanding.

(R.0043-0044)

Plaintiff rented his own office in Ogden, paid the rent out of
earnings of tr,e business, and hired and paid his own secretary. He signed
for the office, "Craig Blamires, Medexam." He ordered a telephone and
listed it under the name "Medexam." He asked Mr. Smith to guarantee the
phone to avoid a $100.00 deposit.

(R.0044) The listing in the name of

Medexam on the office rental agreement and with the phone company is completely in line with the franchise arrangement between the parties. A
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franchisee would be expected to u~e the trade name that he had obtained
;ights to in such instances.

As respects the guarantee on the phone, it

would appear simply to be a matter of Medexam doing a favor for Plaintiff
to avoid putting out a $100.00 cash deposit.
On one

occas~on

Mr. Smith of Medexam attempted to assert some

minor controls over Plaintiff to rearran!:le Plaintiff:s office.

Plaintiff's

secretary firmly refused to allow such infringement upon Plaintiff's control over his business, including the arrangement of the office furniture,
equipment, etc.

(R.0044)

Plaintiff paid his rent, his expenses including gas, office supplies, and equipment, advertising costs, secretarial wages, his satellite
operators, telephone, etc., through his own checking account and kept his
own books and records regarding his business.

(R.0042, 0047)

The above stated facts amply support the decision of the Appeals
Referee as affirmed and adopted by the Board of Review.
engaged in an independently established business.

Plaintiff was

under Section 22(j)(l) of the Act did not exist between Plaintiff and
Medexam.

If the Court should find otherwise and apply the ABC tests of

Section 22(j)(5), the above facts clearly support the decision that under
the "C" test and the North American Builders casi 9 criteria, Plaintiff
was customarily engaged in an independently established trade or profession.
POINT V
THE SERVICES PERFORMED BY PLAINTIFF ARE EXCLUDED FROM
"EMPLOn1ENT" AS DEFINED IN THE UTAH EMPLOYMENT SECURITY
ACT UNDER THE "A" AND "B" TESTS OF THE "ABC" TEST OF
SECTION 22(j)(5) OF THE ACT.
29 see Footnote 21, supra.
20

I

A service relationship
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The "A" and "B" tests are as follows:
22(j)(5) Services performed by an individual for wages or
~nde~ any contract of hire, written or oral, express or
1mpl1ed, shall be deemed to be emploJment subjeot t• this
act unless and until it is shown to the satisfaction of the
commission that:
(A) Such individual has been and will continue to be free
from control or direction over the performance of such services, both under his contract of hire and in fact;
(B) Such service is either outside the usual course of the
business for which such service is performed or that such
service is performed outside of all the places of business
of the enterprise for which such service is performed; and30
The "A" test refers to control.
over the performance of the service.

•

It must be control or direction

In the case of Salt Lake T.rtbune PUb-

lishing Company v. Industrial Commission,31 the court considered the nature

of the supervision exercised by the alleged employer (1) as to the method
of doing the work, or (2) just as to the result.
The Indiana Appellate Court in the Alumiwall case, 32 quoted and
followed in the North American Builders case, 33 qtnsidered
the "A" control
,,
test in some depth.
the Utah statute.

The wording of the Indiana Act is almost identical with
The wording "to be free from control or direction over

the performance" is exactly the same. Quoting from Alumiwall:
. . . the legislature in using the term "control or direction":

"* * * intended the meaning given to these words in Webster's
New International Dictionar. 'Control' is there defined as:
4 To exercise restraining or directory influence over; to
dominate; to regulate; hence to hold from action; to curb;
30 utah
31

see Footnote 16, supra.

32see
33

Code Annotated 1953, 35-4-22(j )(5).

Footnote 24, supra.

see Footnote 21, supra.
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su~jec~; ?verpower.' :oire:tion' is defined as: (3) That
wh1ch 1s 1mposed by d1rect1ng; a guiding or authoritative
instruction; prescription; order; command.'"

Under the facts above set forth the applicators were free
t? perform the services.when and in such manner as they saw
f1t. They provided the1r own tools and equipment, and
could, if they so desired, hire helpers and determine the
wage scale of such helpers. The only restriction was that
they perform such services in a good and workmanlike manner. Such restriction is inherent in all services performed
by one for another. To hold that such a restriction is
the retention of direction and control over such service
so as to exclude it from provision (A) is against good
reasoning and common sense.
The statutory test as enacted by the legislature requires
more than the mere power to have the applicators cease
their performance of the service upon a showing that such
service was not being performed in the manner in which it
should be performed. There should be some control and
direction over the manner, method, and means in which the
services are performed.34
The evidence in the record in the instant case is ample to support'
the finding of the Commission that the "A" test was satisfied, i.e., that
Plaintiff was free from direction and control by Medexam over the performancf
of his work in performing physical examinations.

In any event the evidence

in the record is such that it cannot be said that the Commission must, as
reasonable men, have found that the claimant was subject to such contro1.
The court in Alumiwall was persuaded by the following elements
indicative of freedom from control.
instant case:
(a)

The same elements are present in the

Freedom to perform the service when and in such manner as
they saw fit.

(b)

Provide own tools and equipment.

34see Footnote 24, supra.
35 see Footnote 18, supra.
22
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(c)

Could hire own helpers and determine Will scale ef said
helpers.

In his brief Plaintiff refers to the following as evidence of
control exercised by Medexam:
(a)

Plaintiff originally

star~ed

working out of his .own home

and then set up his own office--this does not indicate
control.
(b)

It is more indicative of an independent business.

Medexam set the price for the various types of physical
examinations to be performed--such is common practice
in franchise arrangements.36

(c) The insurance companies paid Medexam who then paid Plaintiff seventy or ninety percent--the arrangement is comparable
to that in the North American Builders case,37 where the
court found there was no evidence of control over the
performance where the homeowner paid the dealer who then
paid the installer.
(d) Medexam provided at no cost to Plaintiff various supplies
and forms--such is normal in franchise operations.
(e) Telephone was listed under the name of Medexam--also
. f ranc h.1se opera t•1ons. 38
norma 1 1n

(f) Medexam retained the phone after termination of the business
relationship--when the relationship was terminated by mutual
36 see Footnote 6, supra.
37see Footnote 28, supra.
38

.

.

See d1scuss1on in Point IV.
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agreement, Plaintiff stepped out and Medexam took over the
office and phone.39
(g)

Mr. Smith, President of Medexam, tried to rearrange the
Plaintiff's office on one occasion--Plaintiff's secretary
firmly refused, 40 indicating her understanding that Medexam
did not have the right to exercise such control.

(h)

A copy of a writing was sent to Plaintiff41 referring to
setting up of specific goals as a device to improve produc·
tion--Mr. Smith explained that "it was not sent out as a
memoranda or requirement to anybody except my own people"
and that it did not relate to people in "partnership
agreements" such as Plaintiff.

(R.0045)

In any event

such general suggestions as to the efficacy of goal setting
would not constitute control over the performance of the
physical examinations.
(i)

There was some direct relationship between Medexam and the
operators hired by Plaintiff--there is some ambiguity in
the record regarding to whom the satellite operators were
contracted.

Plaintiff stated they signed an agreement

with Medexam.

(R.0049) Mr. Smith stated that "they were

not contracted to Medexam, they were contracted to him
(Plaintiff)."
Blamires:

(R.0049)

As per Mr. Smith's advice, they w~re co~sidered
independent contractors and per h1s adv1ce, I
had them fill out a letter, basic form they had

39see discussion in Point III.
4Dsee R.0044 and Point IV.
41Exhibit 2 (R.0026).
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given me, just a sheet which said Medexam will
do this and said that they will do this. (R.OOSO)
The status of these satellite operators is beyond the scope
of this appeal. They may have been independent contractors
as designated by Plaintiff in the above quote.

If they

were, it would seem to further support the decision of the
Commission that Plaintiff was independent and not subject
to control of Medexam.
As stated above in the Alumiwall case, "There should be some control and
direction over the manner, method,
formed" (emphasis added). 42

and~

in which the services are per-

None of the factors relied upon by Plaintiff

mentioned above indicate control of any sort over the manner or method of
performing the physical examinations.
The Plaintiff refers to the Croecuneries of America v. Industrial.
commission case. 43 The court in said case determined that the decision of
the Commission was supported by the evidence.
While there is dispute in the evidence as to the above facts,
the evidence in the record clearly discloses that the Commission might reasonably have found that the claimant was not
free from "contra 1" . . . 44
The court therefore refused to upset the decision of the Commission.

In the

instant case there is certainly substantial evidence to support the decision
of the Commission that Plaintiff was free from control as respects the method

and means of performance.
The Salt Lake Tribune Publishing Company v. Industrial. Commission
45
case, is similar to the Creameries of America case, supra, in that the
42
43

See Footnote 34, supra.
98 Ut. 571, 102 P. 2d 300 {1940).

t{: I

45

c.
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court refused to upset the decision of the Commission where it was "supported
by substantial evidence."

There was evidence in the Tribune case that the

papercarriers were supervised as to the perfonnance of their work.

There is

no evidence of such supervision in the instant case.
Coming now to the "B" test of the "ABC" test:
{B) Such service is either outside the usual course of
the business for which such service is performed or that
such service is perfonned outside of all the places of
business of the enterprise for which such service is performed; and46
It is true that Plaintiff as a franchisee operated his business
under the trade name "Medexam" and the phone number was 1 is ted under the
same name.

However, such is characteristic of a franchise operation.47

These factors did not make Plaintiff's office in Ogden a "place of business"
of Medexam.

As already mentioned,48 Plaintiff rented the office and ordered

the phone using his own name together with the trade name "Medexam," hired
his own secretary, purchased, rented, or leased the equipment, furnishings, ·
I

and supplies, had his own checking account which he used to pay all of his
expenses, kept his own books and records, etc.

The record is clear that

Plaintiff's office in Ogden was Plaintiff's place of business and not a
place of business of Medexam.

The Commission properly found, albeit not

expressly but by implication, that the "B" test was satisfied.
CONCLUSION
A quote from the Indiana Appellate Court case of News Pub~ishi~ '
Company v. Verweire et az. 49 pretty well sums up the position of Defendant

in this case:
46utah Code Annotated 1953, 35-4-22(j)(5)(B).
47 see Point I.
48see Point IV.
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We recognize and approve the well-established rule that Acts
of this kind should be liberally construed in order that the
beneficent intent of the Legislature shall be made effective.
On the other hand the intent of the Legislature may be destroyed through judicial interpretation which broadens such an
Act to include persons never intended to have been so included.
An examination of the facts in the case discloses that Plaintiff was not in
"employment" as defined in the Act and case law. Plaintiff and Medexam occu•
pied vis-a-vis each other a franchise relationship rather than employer-employee
or partnership. Such relationship was not a "service" relationship under the
Section 22(j)(l) test.

If the court should find it necessary to go beyond the

Section 22(j)(l) test and apply the ABC tests of Section 22(j)(5), each of
said A, B, and C tests was amply satisfied as disclosed by the record. The
criteria and elements for satisfying the "C" test as set forth in the North
American Builders case have been followed and satisfied in the instant case.
The decision of the Defendant Board of Review of the Industrial Commission
of Utah, being supported by substantial evidence, should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
Attorneys for Devendant
ROBERT B. HANSEN
Utah Attorney General
FLOYD G. ASTIN
WINSTON M. FAUX
Special Assistants
Attorney General
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